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In this paper we re-visit the activities of the Royal African Company (hereafter, the
RAC) and its owners in the booming equity markets of 1720 London. This topic has
been the sole attention of authors only once before (Carlos, Moyen and Hill 2002)
and we want to expand upon that history. There are several reasons why it is now
opportune to do so.
First, there exist only three datasets of the requisite quality and completeness
that will allow study of trading behaviour of individual investors during the South
Sea Bubble. One of these datasets, the trade in Bank of England (BoE) shares, has
been previously studied (Carlos and Neal 2006; Carlos, Neal and Wandschneider
2007). To that dataset have been joined data on trade in East India Company (EIC)
shares (Mays and Shea 2011 and Shea 2011). The only other data of comparable
quality to the EIC and BoE data are data on trade in the RAC’s engrafted
(subscription) shares that were issued in 1720.
2 One of the objects of this paper
therefore is to integrate RAC subscription share trade data into the combined EIC
and BoE trade networks that were the particular subjects of study by Mays and Shea
(2011) and Shea (2011). The RAC engraftment was a subscription for new equity
that took place within a fortnight near the end of April 1720. It was not the only
subscription that sprung up at that time. We have the lists of persons for two major
insurance ventures as well as the first two of four issues of shares by subscription by
the South Sea Company. Who were the people that participated in these
subscriptions? What did they have in common with, and how did they differ from,
investors who were already established as owners of shares in the EIC, the BoE or
2 Regrettably, no data for trade in South Sea Company shares exist.
Trading data has to be nearly 100 percent complete if it is to
describe a network of trade with information on investors’ stock
inventories and the speed by which they conduct their transactions.
For this reason we have to exclude from our studies the data on
trade in original, fully-paid RAC shares that have been analysed by
Carlos, Maguire and Neal (2006). It is clear that such very large
amounts of data for this trade are missing for the late summer and3
even in the RAC itself? What relations would they have had with people who were
newly subscribing monies to marine insurance ventures or to the South Sea
Company?
A second reason to look again at the RAC’s attempts to re-finance its trade in
slaves is that we can now come to a slightly more refined conclusion with regard to
its impact in the transatlantic market for slaves. The database on the trans-Atlantic
slave trade that is the product of David Eltis and his numerous collaborators is an
element in making such a re-assessment possible (Eltis and Richardson 2008). The
RAC, in co-operation with the South Sea Company, took advantage of the financial
conditions of early 1720 and a window of opportunity for British participation in the
slave trade to attempt to regain some status as a supplier of slaves. Although those
conditions would not persist for more than three years after 1720, the RAC was in
that period able to maintain the size of equity investment in its activities at the
highest levels that had ever been achieved in the Company’s history. We support this
assertion by presenting a reconstruction of the long-term history of equity values and
returns to RAC investors (Appendix A). It is a mistake therefore to place the RAC
re-financing of 1720 alongside the more ephemeral speculative endeavours that were
supposed to be the by-product of the South Sea boom. Numerous authors have
recounted these ventures as largely spurious promotions, although we have to count
at least two of them as being completely successful because the London Assurance
and the Royal Exchange Assurance exist to this day. Before they were themselves
absorbed into even larger insurance company amalgamations after 1970, they were
amongst the largest and most successful insurance firms in the world. And both were
first financed in the booming markets of 1720 (Drew 1950 and Supple 1973). The
RAC that emerged from a financial re-structuring in 1720 thus falls somewhere
autumn of 1720 that construction of data for net trade between
individuals is impossible (Mays and Shea, 2011, Appendix A).4
between the more ephemeral promotions of 1720 and these two completely
successful insurance company promotions.
A third reason to look again at the RAC re-financing is that it is simply a
heretofore unappreciated example of precocious financial engineering. A reader of
only the introductory and the survey literature of the South Sea Bubble would expect
that no such examples would exist, for in that literature financial managers are
depicted largely as duplicitous and naïve and investors, of course, are for the most
part hysterical (Hoppit 2002). The evidence we present is circumstantial, but
weighty, because it is consistent with a number of design features of the RAC’s
subscription share issues and the market’s responses to them. The evidence will be
easily understood by any student of elementary corporate finance theory who has
mastered the mechanics of designing a rights-issue of equity shares in credit-
constrained markets for finance. DuBois (1938) recognised that subscription
financing was ubiquitous in early modern British corporate finance and, from a legal
perspective, he recognised that it was also distinct from other forms of equity
financing. Investors in subscription shares would possess an option to deny to a
corporation already-promised finance in circumstances described by law and
contract. Ignoring this aspect of subscription finance has already had a deleterious
effect on the literature of the South Sea Bubble (Shea 2007a and 2007b). We shall
show that the RAC subscription shares have the same features of the eighteenth-
century subscription shares surveyed by DuBois – indeed, we will show that this is
the only sensible way that the prices of the RAC subscription shares can be
understood. To establish this thesis in the South Sea Bubble literature could also be
of benefit in future research on the Bubble. An empirical student of modern bubbles
and crashes knows the value of having at hand data on the value of derivative
securities. Analysing the values of derivative securities is a way towards measuring5
such things as the size of risk (expected volatility) and the market price of risk. We
proceed with this task immediately in the following section.
I
The RAC subscription share issue of 1720 arose from an equity capital enlargement
scheme that was called an "engraftment". A complete description of the engraftment
design is found in an indenture agreement between the Company and a group of
trustees who administered the engraftment.
3 The subsequent performance of the
engraftment is described in a 1724 report by the trustees to the Company.
4 Our
account in this section draws heavily upon these two documents.
The engraftment was devised by one Joseph Taylor and several officers of the
RAC who are named in the indenture. Joseph Taylor was not part of the Company’s
management, nor was he a RAC shareholder, although we have observed elsewhere
that he was an active investor and trader in EIC and BoE stock. He is not otherwise
identified in RAC sources, but from his signature, which also appears in many other
BoE documents, we know that he was the same Joseph Taylor who was the clerk of
Bridewell Royal Hospital, prominent Tory lawyer (Inner Temple), close associate of
Bishop Atterbury and later MP (Sedgwick 1970, vol.2, pp. 463-4). Taylor’s expertise
might well have been applied to only the legal structure of the document and the
financial design of the engraftment was authored by Company officers. We do not
know enough about the origins of the engraftment to identify who was the author of
its financial provisions, although there is so much on the matter in the
correspondence of James Brydges, first Duke of Chandos, to suggest that the Duke
was one of the major promoters of the scheme and may have had a hand in its
3 T70/101 Minutes of the General Court, 1678-1720 [page 196 verso].
4 T70/115/199, Report of the Trustees of the Proprietors of the Old
Stock, Submitted to the Committee of Accounts of the Royal African
Company, April 30, 1724.6
design.
5 In early 1720 Chandos repeatedly referred to Taylor and ‘cousin’ Walcot as
being intimately concerned with the new RAC financing. Humphrey Walcot, who
was a relation by marriage to Chandos, was a Director of the RAC. In many letters
Chandos was clearly managing the allocation of new shares on the subscription list to
friends, mostly aristocratic. In two letters he was also concerned in the post-
engraftment powers the Company would have to call upon shareholders to contribute
more capital. We cannot find letters, however, in which he appeared to have been
involved in the design of the engraftment itself.
6 At the time Chandos was writing
these letters he was not yet a RAC shareholder.
The engraftment indenture agreement opens with a preamble which states
that a new cash infusion was needed to remove a burden of debt and to reinvigorate
the Company's trade. The RAC had an old, but vulnerable, position in the legally
sanctioned transatlantic slave trade, but after the Glorious Revolution it endured
years of losses and deteriorating trading conditions caused by competitors and war
(Carlos and Kruse 1996). To revive its trade it would need new investment and the
indenture specified that new capital was to be in the form of equity to be sought from
the public. The Company was seeking to more than quadruple the number of shares
issued and outstanding, implying that new subscribers would end up owning more
than 3 shares for every original share outstanding. In this very important respect the
RAC subscription share issue was different from the South Sea Company
subscription share issues that were occurring at the same time; subscribers to the
5 Correspondence of James Brydges, Stowe Collection, Huntington
Library. My grateful thanks to Larry Neal for providing to me
extensive transcripts of this correspondence.
6 Chandos to Taylor and Chandos to Lockwood, both 18 March 1720,
Stowe Collection. Corroborating evidence of Joseph Taylor’s identity
is in the former letter when Taylor is referred to as having acted
as Lord Castlemaine’s solicitor. The RAC, under its charter, was
obliged to define the limit of the liability on shares, which could
be in principle be larger than the monies originally contributed to
the firm by shareholders. In these letters Chandos is responding to7
RAC shares would end up owning more than 75 p.c. of the firm's equity, whereas
South Sea subscribers could never expect to own more than 15 p.c. of South Sea
equity.
7 Since original shareholders were being asked to effectively relinquish
control of the Company to new investors, it is not surprising that the indenture
agreement established strong safeguards for original shareholder rights and wealth.
Original shares numbered 4,304 and the indenture specified that there would
be added to them 15,696 new shares to result in 20,000 shares in all. The original and
newly engrafted capital would be assigned a new book value of £500,000. That is,
each of the 20,000 shares would be rated at a nominal value of £25 per share (p.s.)
and that would also be the price that subscribers would have to eventually pay for
their 15,696 shares. Thus it was planned that £392,400 would be the total monies
raised by the new issue.
8 It is that this point that the indenture clearly turns its
attention to the protection of original shareholders. The indenture states that the best
estimated value for all original assets (“stock”) was £240,000, but original
shareholders would own only £107,600 (=£500,000×4,304/20,000) of the £500,000
new book value, so they must be compensated £132,400 (= £240,000 - £107,600) out
of the £392,400 paid by newly subscribing shareholders.
To the modern student of corporate finance the language of the document at
this point is decidedly strange. How did the authors know that current assets were
worth £240,000? More strangely, why would they specify a new book value of only
£500,000 when they clearly intended to add another £392,400 to the Company’s
coffers? The £240,000 figure appears to be what we would now style a minimum net
critics that the proposed limit of 132 p.c. might be too small to
allow further expansion in the RAC’s trade.
7 Shea (2007b), Supplementary Appendix B, presents an analysis of
the size of the South Sea Company’s subscription share issues.
8 By 1726 £387,967 had indeed been collected from subscribers (see
T70/1186, Rough Drafts and Copy Book A [contra 142], "London April
1726, An account of the several sums of money paid in originally and
since the Company's establishment by subscriptions, calls or
otherwise").8
asset value and was probably derived by simply looking at the market values of
existing shares in early to mid-April 1720. What we show below is that the choice of
a book value for shares merely reflects the fact that the authors wanted to raise
£260,000 in new funds to be invested in a revival of the Company’s physical trade in
slaves. Given that target for new funds to be raised, the size of the subscription issue
in numbers of new shares would have to have been driven by a choice of an issue
price for new shares. Indeed, the choice of the issue price for new shares was to some
extent arbitrary, so to really understand the details of the engraftment we need to ask
the question as to why the issue price was chosen to be £25 p.s. After all, at the time
the engraftment was being drafted RAC share prices were over £60 p.s.
To unravel the reasoning by which these choices were made we need to look
a little further into the indenture. Recall the document specified that compensation to
original shareholders would have to be financed up to the amount of £132,400, but
what precise forms would that compensation take? First and foremost, original
shareholders were to be freed of debt. The £132,400 was to be split into two basic
funds - £80,000 and £52,400. The £80,000 was for the discharge of a list of
enumerated debts amounting to as much as £75,696. This sum was to be delivered by
Joseph Taylor to a group of the Company's officers within 21 days after the indenture
agreement came into effect. The Company’s servants who would then settle and
discharge the debts. The residual £4,304 from the £80,000 was to be Joseph Taylor’s
reward for his role in the scheme. The firm’s debt-to-equity ratio was approximately
1:3 (£80,000/£240,000), so we cannot write that the firm was particularly heavily
encumbered with debt. The debt, however, was largely long-standing and was owed
to many of the firm’s suppliers.
9 The debts appear to have been originally short-term
9 T70/11/5199, cf. fn. 4.9
bills owed to these suppliers and to honour these debts was probably a pre-condition
for raising new financing.
The other fund of £52,400 was to be delivered by Joseph Taylor to the
Company by 1 December 1720 and was to be put to two uses. If more debts were to
be discovered, they would be paid out of the £52,400-fund. Secondly, once all such
debts were satisfied, the residual would be distributed to the original shareholders in
the form of a cash dividend up to £10 p.s. Finally, if the £52,400 were sufficient to
pay all debts and to pay the maximum cash dividend of £10 p.s., then the residual
monies would be paid to other Company officers for their efforts in administering the
engraftment.
We are fortunate to have discovered know how some of the terms of
indenture agreement worked out. At least we know how they worked out till the end
of April 1726.
10 Joseph Taylor got his £4,304 fee, but the eventual debts of the
Company were higher than at first expected. The maximum £10 p.s. cash dividend
was not realised and what original shareholders actually got was about £8.34 p.s. But
the RAC engraftment worked just about as planned: nearly the whole sums of monies
projected to be raised, were raised; the costs of administering the engraftment were
contained within the amounts budgeted and all old creditors to the company had been
paid in full. This was all accomplished in the difficult financial conditions that
followed the collapse of the South Sea scheme.
A primary reason that the subscription was successful was the care taken in
protecting the wealth of existing shareholders. There were two mechanisms used to
do this that are immediately recognisable to the modern student of corporate finance:
i) under-pricing of shares and ii) dividend budgeting. We shall illustrate how the
engraftment could have been designed in modern terms and hopefully the reader will
10 T70/1186, cf. fn. 8.10
begin to see the precocious elements of its design. New shareholders had the chance
to subscribe for new shares at a subscription price of £25 p.s. and these shares would
eventually stand equal to fully-paid shares. At the time the indenture was finally
drawn up in early April 1720, fully-paid shares were valued at about £63 p.s. That
would have made original shareholder wealth (gross) 4,304£63  £271,200 at that
time. To this would be added £392,400 from new shareholders, making total value of
Royal African equity equal to £271,200 + £392,400 = £663,600. Spread over 20,000
shares this would make the long-term expected value of equity about £33.2 p.s. =
.
000 , 20
25 £ 696 , 15
000 , 20
63 £ 304 , 4 


We thus conclude that if there were no mechanisms in
the engraftment scheme for the protection of original shareholders’ wealth, their
wealth would have been expected to decline by about £30 (= £63 - £33) p.s.
This potential loss of £30 p.s. in shareholder wealth was precisely prevented
by the terms of the indenture agreement. We can now surmise that two numbers, i)
the adjusted book value of assets and ii) the assignment of £240,000 to the value of
original shares, were numbers jointly chosen to avoid these wealth losses. The
resulting protection against wealth losses was manifested in two ways. First, new
shareholders directly relieved original shareholders of £75,696 in debts. This relief
was worth about £18 p.s. ). shares 304 , 4 / 696 , 75 £ ( Secondly, original shareholders
were also given the budget of £52,400 (or about £12 p.s.), which could be used to
either relieve them of any further debts or to pay a cash dividend of up to £10 p.s. So,
altogether these two funds would deliver an approximate £30 p.s. compensation to
original shareholders.
The indenture agreement, of course, also had to work well and completely or
else the anticipated £392,400 would not be paid to the Company. This is where the
underpricing of the subscription shares would have played a role. Joseph Taylor was11
responsible for delivering funds to the Company's officers in full and in a timely
fashion. If for any reason he failed in these tasks, the original shareholders would be
the losers. The task facing Mr. Taylor was to define a group of people who could
subscribe for shares which, we have already calculated, would have an expected
market value of about £33 p.s. These persons would have rights to these shares by
paying the special price defined in the indenture agreement. By setting that price
(£25 p.s.) to a number well below the expected value of shares, the writers of the
indenture would have made sure that Mr. Taylor’s solicitation of subscriptions was
easy. A second set of features of the subscription shares that would have made them
popular is that they were issued in small denominations and in large numbers. As
long as investors could have rationally expected that RAC shares would never fall to
a value less than £33 p.s., it would make sense to buy the subscription shares and to
continue to make payments on their instalments.
The indenture stipulated that a £8 per new share deposit would very quickly
be made to the Company. Further instalments collected by Mr. Taylor would be due
on or before 1 June (£5 per new share), 1 September (£5 per new share) and 1
December (£7 per new share). Relatively small instalments due from Mr. Taylor put
relatively little pressure on the numerous subscribers in paying their instalments. The
original deposit on the shares would be sufficient to extinguish the Company’s debts
and was nearly enough as well to fill the budget for the promised maximum £10 p.s.
dividend to original shareholders. The subsequent payments on the subscription
shares would then become the new equity investment in the revival of the RAC’s
trade.
The re-financing of the RAC was a near complete financial success. In the
stringent credit conditions of 1720 and 1721 there were defaulters, to be sure, but
most of them eventually made good their obligations to the Company (with interest)12
by 1724. But how was the refinancing viewed by the markets after the subscriptions
were made? The boom and crash in equity values in 1720 were market-wide. Like
South Sea Company, EIC and BoE shares, RAC share values rose and fell
spectacularly. The values of the subscriptions shares followed this same pattern, but
there is nothing remarkable about this fact. After all, subscriptions shares were
ultimately claims upon original shares at a later date and thus they were literally
derivative securities; their markets values would have to have been derivative of the
market values for RAC original shares. But we know that in our own times the
relative pricing of derivative securities can be analytically challenging. How hard
would this task have been in the markets of 1720? The task actually would have been
trivially easy.
Any owner of a subscription share could have chosen not pay instalments on
the shares as long as he or she was willing to bear the costs of doing so. These costs
could have been penalties imposed by the Company or by law. It matters not how
easy or by what means such penalties could be imposed because as long as there was
no incentive to default on instalments, subscribers would not likely do so.
11 As was
discussed above, this was what underpricing of the RAC subscriptions shares
achieved. Such underpricing was not a feature of the South Sea Company’s own
subscription issues and that is what makes their pricing more difficult to model (Shea
2007b). The underpricing of RAC subscription shares would have forced their
market price to conform to a simple pricing identity, which we now illustrate.
We first pose a counterfactual situation in which the subscription shares were
simply fractional claims upon original shares. To take an example, compare the price
of subscription shares and original shares (Poriginal) on 1 June, 1720. On that date a £5
11 In November 1720, in what amounted to a further lowering of the
subscription price of its shares, the RAC further delayed the last
instalment in order to forestall defaults T70/90, Minute Book of the
Court of Assistants, 18 Nov 1720, pp. 131-2.13
instalment was due on the subscription shares, but there were still to be paid another
£5 (due 1 September) and a final £7 (due 1 December). We suppose therefore that on
2 June a subscription share would represent a fractional (£13/£25) claim on an
original share that was shorn of the dividend that was budgeted in the engraftment
indenture; the value of that would be (£13/£25)(Poriginal - PV[£10]). From this
quantity we can construct an arbitrage lower bound on subscription share values and
will argue that this bound would have to be obeyed, thus
(£13/£25)(Poriginal - PV[£10]) + PV(instalments)  Psubscription. (1)
If the bound was not obeyed, anyone who could buy a subscription share and borrow
the present value of the remaining instalments would be able to obtain the equivalent
of an original share at a cost smaller than that demanded in the market for such
shares. If the bound appeared to be exactly binding, then we would have to conclude
there was no possible value in the subscription shares attributable to a default option
on instalments. Equivalently, if we were to assume there were no barriers to investors
from borrowing the PV of the remaining instalment, Inequality 1 would reduce to an
identity
(£13/£25)(Poriginal - PV[£10]) + PV(instalments) ≡ Psubscription. (2)
Did Equation 2 hold practically as an identity? Within the limitations of the
data we have to judge such matters, the identity appears to hold very well. To finely
test Equation 2 the demands on the data are very high. Equation 2 would hold only
for original share prices and subscription share values that were perfectly
contemporaneous. We have no assurances in our data sources that such prices, even14
when listed for the same day, were contemporaneous. We do not know if prices were
collected at different times of the day, indeed, we do not know if prices from
previous days were not sometimes carried over to subsequent days in print. We do
not even know if the numbers reported are quotations from potential buyers and
sellers or whether they represent actual transaction values. Secondly, we do not have
good information as to how investors would have formed expectations as to the
special dividend that was to be paid to original shareholders. As late as 1724 we
know something of the old debt liabilities that had been newly discovered after April
1720, but we do not know how information about these discoveries were absorbed by
the markets nor how far from the maximum of £10 p.s. dividend investors’
expectations would have strayed. Finally, credit conditions were notoriously tight
throughout late 1720 and into 1721. Arbitrageurs would have had to always have
reliable access to credit to make sure the arbitrage bounds were never violated. But
we suspect that the costs of such arbitrage were sufficiently small and would have
had to operate on only a small number of transactions to keep the arbitrage bound
solid. Credit financing for such operations should have still been forthcoming
because subscription shares were still strongly underpriced; even in late 1720
original share prices had not slipped below £30 p.s.
Despite the caveats stated above, Figure 1 illustrates a close adherence to
Equation 2 and suggests that deviations from it were not economically meaningful. It
depicts the value quotations for African ex-dividend original shares (assuming that
the expected special dividend never wavered from £8 p.s.) and subscription shares
plus the present value of the remaining instalments.
12 The pricing errors (denote them
12 The present value of the instalments takes a slight step on 18
November (not perceptible in the graph) when the Company announced
that only £4 would be due 1 December and not £7. The present value
of the remaining £3 was calculated upon the assumption that it would
not be due until 21 March 1721, which was the assumption made by
Carlos, Moyen and Hill (2002, page 79).15
e) also appear to have been statistically insignificant. In Table 1 we present the mean
pricing errors and their associated probability values from a t-distribution. In
calculating pricing errors we assumed that the expected dividend was constant
throughout 1720-1 and we present in the table calculations for a range of such
constant expected dividends. We do not wish to suggest that the investors actually
had unchanging expectations for the special dividend, but simply wish to illustrate
that, even under such an unrealistic assumption, it is possible to find a plausible
constant expected dividend argue that makes pricing errors statistically small. Figure
1 illustrates that most pricing errors were very small, but that there was also a
minority of observations for which pricing errors could be large. To reduce the
influence of such outliers we can look also at the percentage pricing errors’ median
absolute deviations. Absolute deviations (AD) refer to the deviations of percentage
pricing errors from their sample median in absolute value. The median absolute
deviation (MAD) is a robust alternative for calculating dispersion in pricing errors in
the presence of outliers.
13 In Table 1 MADs are only about one-half of the standard
deviations of their respective ADs. The minimum average pricing errors and the
minimum MAD occurred for an assumed constant expected dividend of £7.5 p.s.,
close to the actual special dividend paid (£8.34 p.s.).
If we could model the dynamic process by which old debts were newly
revealed and ate into the engraftment’s dividend budget, we could perhaps model the
market’s expectations of the eventual dividend payout more precisely. This is where
our analysis departs substantially in disagreement with what has been written before.
Carlos, Moyen and Hill (2002) in their analysis of RAC share prices do not attempt
to price subscription shares relative to original shares, but attempt instead to isolate
two separate pricing residuals, one for original shares and one for subscription
13 Iglewicz 1983, pages 407-8.16
shares, which could be used in tests for rational bubbles. Arguing from the long RAC
history of unpredictable earnings and reminding the reader that original shares would
receive the special dividend that the subscription shares would not share in, they
justify the modelling of a unique fundamental for the subscription shares. We argue
that this approach was not justified because they did not identify the subscription
shares as being derivatives of original shares. All future payouts to both original and
Table 1. Analysis of RAC Subscription Share Pricing Errors
E(Div) Mean e p-value MAD std(AD)
£10 p.s. -£2.66 0 4.7% 5.0%
£9 p.s. -£1.66 0 3.1% 5.1%
£8 p.s. -£0.67 0.02 3.1% 5.4%
£7.5 p.s. -£0.19 0.48 2.1% 5.2%
£7 p.s. £0.29 0.29 2.7% 5.1%
£6 p.s. £1.27 0 2.6% 5.0%
£5 p.s. £2.25 0 2.7% 5.0%
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Figure 1. Royal African Company Original & Subscription Share Values
1720 (Freke 1722)17
subscription shares were to be exactly the same except for the special promised
dividend of £10 p.s. Because this dividend was budgeted and the funds for it
collected at the beginning of the subscription, it would not have been subject to the
earnings uncertainties that would affect all other dividends. The only uncertainty
about the special dividend would have concerned whether any old debt liabilities
would appear and reduce the budget for the promised £10 p.s. payout.
14 That
certainly did happen to a small degree, but otherwise the funds for the special
dividend remained in the hands of trustees, to be paid out to original shareholders
when subscriptions shares became fully paid. In the end the special dividend paid out
was £8.34 per original share – remarkably quite close to the constant £7.5 p.s. that
minimises mean pricing errors in Table 1.
II
We have argued that the engraftment’s design was precocious in its provisions for
protecting shareholder wealth and the markets were precocious in pricing the new
subscription shares relative to original shares. We have written much about how the
engraftment worked, but not much about the more fundamental decisions that
determined its design. For example, why did the firm not just borrow more money to
invest in its renewed slave trade and to replace the old debts? From the long list of
debts enumerated in 1726 that were retired by the re-financing of 1720, many of
them significantly pre-dated 1720 itself and from this alone we can infer the firm’s
chequered history in reliably servicing debt. In the stringent credit conditions of 1720
as well, it is not surprising that further large-scale debt issues might have been out of
the question. So, there remained equity financing and in the buoyant markets of late
14 From the commencement of the engraftment one year was to be
allowed for any further debts to appear. At the end of April 1721
the Court of Directors made one last plea for old creditors to18
1719 and early 1720 that would have appeared attractive. Relative to the values of
RAC equity in early 1720, the financing needs drawn up by the Company’s
management and the controlling projector of the new scheme, who appeared to be
the Duke of Chandos, were quite large. If the current ownership of the firm was itself
financially constrained, the engraftment of equity would have to be financed by
outsiders. Otherwise, we would need to ask why RAC original shareholders
themselves did not simply supply more equity investment to the firm. If the market
supply of equity was that buoyant, we would have to conclude that original RAC
shareholders themselves must have been especially constrained financially. This
indeed appeared to be the case. More than 82 p.c. of subscribers to the engraftment
did not own RAC shares at the end of 1719 or in May 1720.
15 Original share owners
who did subscribe were mostly large shareholders. In terms of ownership of original
shares, owners of just more than half (51 p.c.) of the Company chose to subscribe,
but they were only about 12 p.c. of the subscribers by number and subscribed only
about 15 p.c. of the engraftment. These patterns in subscription participation possibly
illustrate the extent to which financial constraints were operating on the engraftment.
Small RAC shareholders were certainly not forthcoming with further capital for the
Company and although a bare majority of the ownership of the RAC was willing to
participate in the engraftment, they would not be large in number and would pledge
to purchase only a small portion of the engraftment.
An issue of shares by rights to original shareholders, no matter how severely
it was underpriced with respect to original shares, would not likely then have raised
present their claims before the special dividend was calculated.
T70/90/217.
15 We are working here from a compilation of RAC share ownership on
31 Dec 1719 as provided in T70/197. For early 1720 the share trading
data contained in T70/198 appears complete enough that we can
compute net sales and purchases of shares down to about late May
1720, but after that date it becomes clear that sufficient data are
missing from this source that further net sales/purchases
calculations are unreliable. cf. fn. 2.19
the amounts of cash desired by the Company. A public issue of new shares would
therefore have appeared to be the only alternative the Company had at this time. But
what would be the terms of a public issue? Design of the issue at this point would
matter to original shareholders because new shares might eventually stand equal to
original shares and if new owners did not contribute cash to the firm equal to what
their shares were worth, original shareholder wealth would decline. We have
analysed this issue in Section I, but it would not have arisen as an issue at all if the
Company had simply chosen to sell new shares to the public at the current market
value of original shares. But would that have raised enough cash to refinance the
firm’s slave trade? The RAC planners apparently decided they wanted to appeal to a
different buying public than the one that currently owned RAC shares or who would
want to own shares in their current form. It was perhaps because equity markets were
buoyant and were attracting a numerous class of new small investors that the
Company planned to issue a large number of small-sized shares into the market. It
was a matter simply to choose what number to sell and at what price per share so that
nearly £260,000 was raised for investment in a revived slave trade. This would have
to have been a judgment about both the breadth and depth of the new markets for
equity in 1720.
If the markets were buoyant enough to supply large numbers of investors
willing to supply equity in small doses, why not just issue a large number of
fractional shares then? This would run a danger of so increasing the number of
individual owners of the firm that it might significantly increase book-keeping costs.
These costs would not have been trivial. One only has to look at the paperwork that
survives in archives today to appreciate the costs required to accurately record the
ownership and transfers of shares. Our impression is that the extra paper and time
required would have been not linear in share numbers and shareowner numbers, but20
was more likely to be exponential. If new investors did indeed desire to supplying
equity in only small doses, one way to tap their supply would be with a subscription
issue. At least with a subscription issue, new investors could be limited in number,
but never be expected to contribute more than one small dose to new equity at one
time. Since the depth and the breadth of the markets for new equity were uncertain,
the Company would have to balance numbers of new shares, numbers of instalments
per share and the issue price per share (size of instalments) to reach its targets for
new financing raised. Original shareholders would not knowingly have agreed to the
engraftment without some protection of their wealth, so the calculus of the RAC’s
financial planners would have to take care that the new financing also raised enough
money to compensate original shareholders for wealth losses. We cannot recreate
their calculations from historical sources, but the mathematics would have been
straightforward enough depending upon how many financial targets they wished to
fulfil. To illustrate and to also demonstrate that underpricing of the new shares at
issue was key to the exploitation of the equity markets’ breadth, we construct a
hypothetical refinancing of the firm at an issue price for shares different from the £25
p.s. that was actually used.
The issue price could have been lower and perhaps substantially lower than
even the £25 p.s. specified in the engraftment indenture. Suppose to meet an
investment target of £260,000 the Company issued new shares at £20 p.s. instead of
£25 p.s. 15,696 new shares at £20 p.s. would raise £319,380 cash, which after
£260,000 was deducted for new corporate investments, would leave only £59,380 to
the relief of original shareholders. This would not even cover original shareholders’
debt liabilities of £75,696. If on the other hand, the first objective was to fully
compensate original shareholders, the £319,380 cash raised would be sufficient to do
that, but how much would be left over for investment in the slave trade? From the21
point of view of the engraftment’s designers in midApril 1720 they judged that the
minimum net value for shares was about £240,000, as we have discussed in Section
I. Expected prices of shares after the engraftment would be expected to become
approximately £28 p.s. .
000 , 20
20 £ 696 , 15 000 , 240 £  
 This would result in an expected
wealth loss to original shareholders of about £240,000 – 4,304×£28 = £119,488. The
£319,380 would certainly cover that loss and would leave nearly £200,000 for the
Company to invest in its trade. Would that have been enough to satisfy the
Company’s planners? We do not know, although Chandos did express in several
letters his feeling that the Company was actually trying to raise more cash than could
be efficiently employed in the African trade.
16
To conclude this section, the provisions of the RAC engraftment certainly
operated to raise new capital and to protect original shareholder wealth. They were
not, however, the only ways these objectives could have been met if circumstances in
1720 had been different from what they were. In different credit conditions original
shareholders might have been able to provide the new financing themselves and/or
the debt markets might have been able to provide financing. Whatever conditions
were for new equity investors who appeared in 1720, they apparently precluded a
supply of equity investment in large doses from a small number of new investors.
The Company sought instead to attract a large number of investors to commit to a
succession of small doses of equity investment. One advantage of a subscription
issue of new shares would be to restrict the number of new small-dose investors. In
the next section we shall try to draw some inferences about who these new investors
were.
16 Chandos to Fielding, 8 June 1720 and various other letters dated
23 June 1720, Stowe Collection.22
III
Who were the investors that helped refloat the RAC and were they typical of those
investors who helped create the South Sea Bubble? From the aristocracy down to the
middling and all the way down to the very small first-time investor, the South Sea
Bubble was supposed to have involved society in financial speculation to an extent to
which it had not been involved before. Or so contemporaries wrote – usually in
complaint (Hoppit 2002, pp. 145-7). But how can we investigate such matters? There
is really only one valid approach to doing this. If we possessed a sufficiently large,
demographically representative sample of the population in 1720, we could randomly
sample from it and compare that sample to groups of investors such as they are
described in investment data. Then we might be able to conclude what particular
portions of the population typically were newly drawn into the markets of 1720.
Unfortunately we have no such good demographic data. We have assembled a
database of nearly 13,000 people but, as large as that number is, it is highly selected
group of people because they are for the most part identified from only investment
sources. More than 70 per cent of them at some time between early 1719 and by
March 1723 appeared as owners of RAC, EIC or BoE shares. We might declare that
they are representative of some class within society that was prone to investment
activities, but we have yet no data with which we can measure how typical they were
of society as a whole. It is perhaps even going too far to claim that they are typical
investors because there are no existing data for South Sea Company share ownership
or trade nor, at this time, have we yet exploited the considerable data that pertain to a
much larger number of people who were invested in British government annuities.
17
We shall also add that as deficient as the data are with regard to the demographics of
17 Dickson (1967, p. 272) states that the number is easily in excess
of 25,000 individuals.23
profession, class, etc., variables indicative of economic status, such as income and
wealth, are simply not available at this time.
Thus at this jointure we have what we can describe only, somewhat tongue in
cheek, as the observable universe of investors in early Georgian London. From the
available sources we have been able to re-construct many of the social and
professional characteristics of these investors. Table 2 is an overview of the data. All
the data sources discussed in the key to the table are sources generated from
investment activity excepting the Parliamentary biographies (Sedgwick, 1970). Table
2 quickly affirms the special character of our data collection. If one thing is clear,
women certainly are demographically under-represented in our data. Although
without comparative wealth statistics for men and women in our data or for the
population as a whole, we cannot even judge if their 15.7 per cent representation is a
remarkably small or a large number. The enumeration of members of the MP-class is
complete and that class will be of course demographically over-represented in our
sample. We suspect that even the merchant class is under-indentified in our sample.
It has to be remembered therefore that the inferences we are about to draw are
conditioned upon data that is drawn from a population that has already been specially
selected for its investment activities.
We conduct an ordinal regression to analyse some of these matters. The ordinal
classification dependent variable will be an indicator of the RAC engraftment
investment class an individual fits into: 1 denotes an individual who made no
subscription; 2 denotes a subscriber to at least five, but no more than 40, shares; 3
denotes a subscriber of at least 45 and no more than 70 shares and 4 denotes a
subscriber of 75 or more shares. In the location portion of the ordinal regression
model, as independent variables, we employ some more ordinal variables. The
ordinal independent variables indicate investor categories. An example will illustrate.24
We define an ordinal classification of ownership in RAC original shares as of 31
December 1719: if an individual owned no RAC shares on that date, he or she was
classified as 1; if the investor owned shares to the amount that puts him or her into
the lower half of the distribution of ownership by numbers of shares, the investor is
denoted as 2; above the median of the same distribution and up to the eighth decile,
the investor is denoted with a 3 and an investor whose shares owned puts him or her
into the upper 20 percent of the same distribution is denoted with a 4. Using the same
percentile distinctions we have defined ordinal variables for the ownership in original
BoE and EIC shares on 31 December 1719, as well. We have also classified25













MP (Commons) class 1197 9.3%
GSBs 250 1.9%
Jewish 337 2.6%
Foreign domiciled 705 5.5%
Baronet/Knight 236 1.8%
Marquis or higher 298 2.3%
Merchant 1055 8.2%






BoE Original Shareholders 31
Dec. 1719
3294 25.6%










South Sea Company, first
Cash Subscription, April 1720
1439 11.2%
South Sea Company, second
Cash Subscription, April 1720
1719 13.4%
Total 12870 100.0%
Key: a) RAC Engraftment Subscribers are persons who took transfers from Joseph Taylor 28 May
or shortly afterwards in sources T70/199, 200, 201 and 202.
b) MP (Commons) class are persons who stood for either the 1715 or 1722 Parliament. They
include unsuccessful candidates and those elected by special elections or appointed upon the deaths
or removals of seated members, according to biographies in Sedgwick (1970).
c) GSBs are goldsmith bankers, bankers or brokers identified mostly in investment ledgers, but
other sources as well, especially in Price, A handbook of London bankers, etc. or in Outing,
BankNotes4U.
d) Jewish identifications are based upon surname lists derived from various genealogical webpages
for the Sephardim and Ashkenazi of early eighteenth century London. Some prominent members of
the Sephardim are also found in Hyamson, The Sephardim of England.
e) Foreign-domiciled persons are identified as such purely in investment ledgers. A few prominent
Dutch merchants would variously appear as both London and Amsterdam domiciled in different
sources. In such cases we have given precedence to the Amsterdam residence.
f) Baronet/Knights are identified as such in either investment ledgers, subscription lists or
Sedgwick.
g) Marquis or higher aristocracy. Same sources as f).
h) Merchants are identified as such mostly in investment ledgers.
i) Stock ledgers are the sources for trading data. They are (RAC) T70/197 through 202, (EIC)
L/AG/14/5/4, and (BoE) AC27/430-437, AC27/6439-6450 and AC27/1539-1558. The dates that
these sources cover depend upon the company. The range of dates for the RAC is the narrowest,
covering from EoY 1719 to July 1720. The BoE sources we have analysed so far provide names of
investors who owned BoE stock between March 1719 and EoY 1721. The list of EIC investor
names include investors who appeared in L/AG/14/5/4 between March 1719 and March 1723.
j) Gender is determined on likelihoods based upon forenames or titles.
k) RAC original shareholders as of 31/12/1719 were identified directly from T70/197.
l) BoE original shareholders as of 31/12/1719 were identified in various BoE Archive sources cited
in note i) above.
m) EIC original shareholders as of 31/12/1719 were identified in L/AG/14/5/4.
n) Mercers-Hall, A list of the names of the subscribers for raising the summe of one million
sterling… This list records subscribers and their voting rights, which are proportional to the number
of shares subscribed. The names are largely found again in various petitions that led up to the
Bubble Act in which the Royal Exchange Assurance was established. See The Special Report.
o) Separate subscriptions were taken for assurance schemes that under the Bubble Act became the
London Assurance. Lord Chetwynd’s subscription (actually gathered by Stephen Ram, Lord
Chetwynd being the titular lead-subscriber) began in November 1719. There was a competing
scheme (Colebrook’s) that was merged with the Chetwynd subscription. We have taken our list of
subscribers to the joint scheme from an Aug 1720 list, Copy of the subscription book of Ram and
Colebrook’s receipts into the capital stock of the ship charter, Aug 12 1720, London Assurance
Archives, Ms. 8725/3.
p) South Sea Company, first and second cash subscription lists are respectively HL/PO/JO/10/5/57
and HL/PO/JO/10/5/58, Papers of the Committee of Secrecy.26
subscribers to the contemporaneous the London Assurance and the first two cash
subscriptions for new South Sea Company shares in the same way. In the case of the
Royal Exchange Assurance subscription, we do not have information on the numbers
of shares subscribed, but do have information on the number of votes subscribers will
have in corporate decision-making, which are proportional to the numbers of shares
subscribed. A subscriber with 1 or 2 votes is classified as a 2. A subscriber with 3
votes is a 3 and a subscriber with 4 or more votes is a 4. The other independent
variables are binary [0,1]-factors that indicate the membership or exclusion from a
class. Table 2 lists all the independent variables we have used in ordinal regressions
and their marginal percentage representation amongst the nearly 13,000 individuals
we have in our database.
Ordinal regressions, like probit regressions, try to predict the probability that an
event or a response will occur. The difference is that in the ordinal regression model
the basic building block is the cumulative probability that an event will be classifiable
into a category contained within an ordered set of categories. A well-behaved function
on the [0,1]-interval is then used to relate the cumulative probability of an occurrence
to a linear function of predictors of that occurrence. The relational functions are
generally called link functions and the probit function is just one of a number of
possibly useful link functions. If Prbj is the probability that an event will fall into the
j-th category, the basic model is
link(Prbj)=θj−[β1x1+β2x2+...+βpxp] (3)
where xi is the i-th variable (out of p) that helps predict classification and θ and βi are
regression coefficients.
In Table 3 are presented the results of estimation of such a model. Estimation
proceeds via maximum-likelihood and goodness-of-fit is summarised by the
significance of the marginal increase in the log likelihood function from a constant-27
only model to one that includes a set of explanatory variables (the model’s so-called
location component) and a selection of pseudo-R-square measures. We do not report
estimates of parameters that are redundant in estimation (such as θ4, which is
restricted to 1) and those that individually are not significant.
18 Recalling that the
point of this exercise is to see how likely we can predict the extent to which people in
our population of 13,000 will appear as subscribers to the RAC engraftment, we see
that the model has only a limited capability of doing that. In units of percents of
variation explained, we can conservatively conclude that the model can reproduce
only anywhere from 10 percent to, at most, 15 percent of that variation.
19 We
employed a complementary log-log link function, which usually has the effect of
concentrating a model’s predictive power on predictions of inclusion in the higher
ordinal groups. What predictive success the model achieves, it achieves in such higher
ordinal predictions. That is, the model’s greatest success is in correctly predicting
those small numbers of individuals who subscribed to 75 or more RAC shares, such
as Chandos. Its ability to predict those who subscribe to any other positive number of
shares (ordinal categories 2 and 3) is greatly less, the vast majority of these people
being predicted to subscribe for no shares at all (ordinal category 1). It is likely that a
more complete description of the socio-economic circumstances of our 13,000
individuals would greatly improve the predictive performance of such models as this
one, but we can still make some interesting inferences concerning the significance of
some of the variables that do and do not appear in the current location portion of the
model. Amongst the ordinal variables we have defined, being an owner of RAC
18 The threshold parameters, the θs, represent constant contributions
to the link function when all other predictor variables are zero. θi
represents this constant for each of the four ordinal dependent
variables.
19 The pseudo-R-squared proposed by Cox and Snell (1989, p. 208) is 1
minus the (2/sample size)-root of the likelihood ratio. Its maximum
is not 1, but is naturally bound below 1. Nagelkerke (1991, p. 692)
proposes that this statistic be divided by its theoretical maximum,28
original shares on 31 December 1719 or being a subscriber to the first of the South
Sea Company’s cash subscription shares is significantly correlated with being a RAC
Table 3. An Estimated Ordinal Regression Model for the Prediction of Investment in










θ1 1.03 .19 30.83 .00 .67 1.40
θ2 1.19 .19 40.83 .00 .84 1.55
θ3 1.8 .19 92.67 .00 1.44 2.18
Location Parameters
RAC Original 31/12/1719 .31 .03 99.65 .00 .25 .37
EIC Original 31/12/1719 .05 .03 3.47 .06 .00 .10
South Sea Subscription 1 .26 .02 123.53 .00 .21 .30
South Sea Subscription 2 .04 .01 7.56 .01 .01 .06
Not identified as a member
of the MP (Commons) class
-.16 .04 13.89 .00 -.25 -.08
Not identified as a GSB -.33 .08 15.24 .00 -.49 -.16
British domiciled .26 .10 6.75 .01 .06 .45
Not identified as a baronet or
knight
-.23 .09 6.84 .01 -.40 -.06
Not identified as an aristocrat
- marquis or higher
-.53 .07 55.20 .00 -.66 -.39
Not identified as a merchant -.09 .06 2.56 .11 -.19 .02
Never identified in a stock
ledger
.33 .03 96.91 .00 .26 .39
Goodness of Fit Pseudo R-Square
-2 Log Likelihood Chi-Square Df Sig. Cox and Snell .050
Intercept Only 2134.465 Nagelkerke .142
Final 1471.972 662.493 11 .000
after which it will be as well-behaved on the [0,1]-interval as is
its conventional linear regression relatives.29
subscriber. The correlations are smaller and not as strongly significant for being an
EIC original shareholder or a subscriber to the second South Sea subscription. The
other contemporaneous subscriptions to the insurance ventures and being an original
BoE shareholder did not correlate with RAC subscriptions at all.
It is salient here to note the importance of the [0,1]-factor variable that
indicates if an individual is among the 70 percent of people who appear in a RAC,
EIC or BoE stock ledgers at some time between 1719 and 1723. After taking into
account that being an RAC or an EIC shareowner on 31 December 1719 is important,
this variable’s estimated coefficient (0.33) shows that it is otherwise important that
the individual does not appear in any of the ledgers of these companies. This
interestingly suggests that there was strong contribution to the RAC subscription from
people who were outside of the observable investment community at the time of the
engraftment. The strength of that contribution is re-enforced when we also consider
that many of them would have newly appeared in the investment community as
subscribers to new shares in the South Sea Company or in the new insurance
companies. In other words, even after having taken into account that new RAC
subscribers might have been amongst a general wave of new investors who were
attracted to all sorts of new share offers, RAC subscribers tended to be outside the
investor groups who were attracted towards BoE and EIC investments. We cannot
aver that this occurred because BoE investors were disinclined towards investment in
RAC shares. If that was the case, the coefficient on the BoE ordinal variable would
have revealed itself to be significantly negative in Table 3. We know little so far of
other characteristics for these people except that they tended to be highly placed
politically. They tended to be members of the MP (Commons) class or were members
of the aristocracy. For sound financial reasons too we see that they were strongly
associated with the GSB class. When we consider that GSBs would have been30
especially adept at placing new issues amongst ultimate investors, this is not
surprising. Just marginally the new RAC subscriber tended to be of the merchant
class. We retain this factor in the model despite its marginal significance and small
size because we feel that merchants may still be under-identified in our sources.
Finally, the new subscription was surely more attractive to the British-domiciled
investor than it was to the foreign investor. The factors that were clearly not
significant were the gender of the investor and whether he or she was Jewish. In Table
3 it was marginally more important that an investor was a merchant than whether he
was Jewish. Since so many professions and politics were closed to the Jewish
community, it is not surprising that they tended to appear as merchants in our sources.
If being Jewish within the merchant community was important with regard to
investment behaviours, it is not showing up in our regression.
20
The RAC subscription appeared to attract a special investor. The investors
who were creating two new companies for marine insurance were not strongly
associated with the RAC re-financing. The same can be said of persons who invested
in BoE shares. Overseas trading merchants might have had a special interest in the re-
financing, but this would require further investigation to establish why they were not
similarly involved in the financing of the new marine insurance firms. At this point all
we know is that being identified as a merchant or as an investor in the EIC or RAC
increased the likelihood that one would be a new RAC investor. Also strongly
associated with this would have been an investment interest in the South Sea
Company’s new shares that were being sold for cash in April 1720. This is the
strongest evidence we have that the RAC re-financing was perhaps riding on a wave
of new investor enthusiasm. The Chandos correspondence that we have previously
20 The activities of Jews in finance in this period were the special
focus of Carlos, Maguire and Neal (2008). Mays and Shea (2011) also31
discussed would suggest that, at least as far as his organisational efforts were
concerned, the RAC re-financing was also a project that was especially dear to the
high-and-mighty of the political and aristocratic classes. This is an effect seen in
Table 3’s results - even after having accounted for the influences of other investment
activities. In further researches on these matters we suspect that the most productive
route would be to look directly into the African trading and slaving community of
London which existed outside of any previous involvement with the RAC. It may be
that the nonRAC trading/slaving community of merchants, the independent traders,
were being drawn into the re-financing and that is a missing factor variable that, if
discovered, could improve the regression model specification.
IV
Not all subscribers to the RAC re-financing would have participated for the sake of
long-term investment. Some would have subscribed to obtain stock for trade or were
directed to do so by associates who themselves were bent on investing in the RAC.
The distribution of new shares from Joseph Taylor to subscribers was merely the first
step in the ultimate placement of shares. Subscribers very quickly began to effect
large net sales of their shares; by the beginning of June they had disposed of 10 per
cent of their shares and another 10 percent had been sold by the middle of June.
Thereafter net sales continued at a slower pace and original subscriber ownership
stabilised at around 60 percent of the original subscription in November 1720. The
pace of transfers between subscribers and nonsubscribers is summarised in Figure 2.
21
The market for RAC subscription shares was what we would style a market for
placements. The marginal adjustments to subscribers’ inventories would necessarily
report the special activities of Jewish merchants as intermediaries
in BoE and EIC stock during the collapse of the South Sea Bubble.
21 Figure 2 depicts sales and purchases over the previous 90 days on
a daily basis.32
have to been large at the commencement of trade. It is obvious in Figure 2 that in the
first three months of trade the entire issue of 15,696 shares was turned over more than
once. By the time the subscription shares were turned into fully-paid shares in July















































































































































































Figure 2. RAC Engraftment Sales and Purchases by Numbers of Shares (top
panel) and by Percentage Decomposition (bottom panel).33
In the previous section we anticipated that goldsmith bankers and brokers
(GSBs) would have probably participated in the subscription to facilitate the
placement of shares. Here we investigate how the placement of RAC shares
proceeded throughout the height of the South Sea Bubble with the aid of the GSBs.
The GSBs were the premiere intermediaries of trade in EIC stock and to a slightly
lesser extent in BoE share trade as well (Mays and Shea 2011). But at the time the
RAC engraftment was getting underway the GSBs were rapidly reducing their
inventories of EIC stock and increasing their inventories of BoE stock. There is also
evidence that they were withdrawing their intermediation services from markets well
before midsummer share values collapsed. In comparison to the EIC and BoE
markets, how was the market for RAC subscription shares intermediated and did the
GSBs play a special role in intermediation? In another paper (Shea, 2011) we
demonstrate how intermediation can be studied on a network of share transfers which
are treated as flows. When share transfer data are arranged to describe the structure of
a network of flows, we can derive measures that are helpful in addressing questions
with respect to financial intermediation. Two concepts are key:
Pass-Through (PT): The total sum of flows that pass through the hands of
trader (per unit of time) is a way of measuring flows. The words ‘pass through’
connote flows that simply pass through a trader’s hands and do not contribute to or
detract from traders’ inventories. PT relative to the accumulation of inventories is a
way of measuring the extent to which flows tend to stop and start in a network. The
ratio of PT to total sales in the network is also one measure, but not a complete
measure, of market intermediation.
Core Pass-Through (CPT): CPT connects all traders who facilitate PT with
other traders who also facilitate PT. The ratio of CPT to PT is another measure of
intermediation, what we might call the density of intermediation. For example, in one34
interpretation, the more fully trade within a network passes through intermediaries
who themselves tend to trade with other intermediaries, the more fully markets are
interconnected by informed or influential traders. In such densely informed
intermediation we would expect that a high proportion of PT would be CPT.
In Figure 3 is the summary history of RAC subscription share intermediation
and the role of GSBs within it. Pass-through as a percent of total sales is the first
intermediation measure we discuss and if Panel B is compared to the same measures
when applied to EIC and BoE trade (Mays and Shea 2011, Figure 16, top panel), it is
clear that that RAC trade was intermediated perhaps not quite as intensely as was EIC
trade and was only slightly more intensely intermediated than was BoE trade. All
three share markets experienced gradual disintermediation in the wake of the South
Sea Bubble.
Where RAC share trade really differed from EIC and BoE share trade was the
extent to which intermediaries dealt with each other. In EIC trade in particular
intermediaries almost never acted alone in obtaining shares from isolated buyers and
passing them on to the ultimate buyer; they almost always obtained and sold shares in
several steps, themselves dealing largely with other intermediaries (Mays and Shea
2011, Figure 16, second top panel). These core intermediaries were noticeably less
important in BoE trade, but in RAC share trade core pass-through was never any
greater than 50 percent of all pass-through. Such core intermediary trade went to zero
by the end of 1720 and only revived slightly in early 1721 before it collapsed to zero
again in the spring (Panel C). GSBs moreover were not as prominent in
intermediation and core intermediation to the extent they had been in EIC and BoE
trade. They never dominated intermediation as a whole (Panel A) and were not
prominent in core intermediation until itself was nearly extinguished (Panel D). The
brief revival of some core intermediation in early 1721 was intermediation by a cadre35
of foreign merchants, who played a similar role in EIC trade at the same time (Figure
3, Panel C and Mays and Shea 2011, Figure 16, third bottom panel).
The trading market for RAC subscription shares was indeed a placement
market and it is not surprising that on a per unit basis the trade was measurably more
intense than was trade in the more established EIC and BoE share markets.
Intermediation in trade there was, to be sure, but it was not as nearly marked by trade
within a core of intermediaries and it certainly was not specially marked out as trade
in which the GSBs were prominent as they were in the EIC and BoE share markets.
There were perhaps fewer incentives for professional intermediaries to deal in RAC
subscription shares, especially if they had to do so as dealers rather than as brokers.
One of the special costs of maintaining an inventory in RAC subscription shares is
that the dealer would have to have the wherewithal to meet instalment obligations on
the shares if he happened to be holding them when instalments became due.36






























































































































































































































Figure 3. RAC Engraftment Subscription Share Pass-Through and Core Pass-Through37
V
The capital restructuring of the Royal African Company during the South Sea Bubble
and afterwards was a success in a period whose history is told largely as a chronicle of
financial failure. The few years after 1720 when the Company attempted to re-
construct its trade, however, were but an Indian-summer in the longer history of the
Company’s equity values and returns. Under Charles II and James II, the Company’s
equity yielded average 6 p.c. p.a. returns and about 60 p.c. of those returns were in the
form of cash payouts. After the Glorious Revolution and in the subsequent 24 years
until 1713, payouts practically ceased and equity declined in value roughly 10 p.c. p.a.
From 1713 to 1719, the Company’s trade was moribund, there were no payouts and
returns were on average neither positive nor negative. The pre-Bubble low-point in
the Company’s equity values occurred in 1718.
22
In the buoyant stock markets of late 1719, however, the Royal African
Company’s share values rose by as much or more than did other firm’s share values;
they had more than doubled over the levels seen at the end of 1718. Historians have
noted before that the year 1720 was actually a year of high returns for shareholders
who owned shares prior to the late spring or early summer of 1720. Even South Sea
Company share values ended 1720 about 50 p.c. higher than they were at the end of
1719, but Royal African share values were four times higher than they were at the end
of 1719 and were more than six times higher than what they were in 1718. Even
through most of 1721 they were more than four times their 1718 values.
For much of the decade after 1720 the Company was capable of attracting
enough equity investment towards the firm to keep total equity values at about the
same level (£200,000) they had been during the years of its greatest prosperity, as
22 This analysis is based upon the equity capital history and data
developed in Appendix A.38
depicted in Figure 4. The Company was able to achieve this even when values of
shares started to slide after 1722. On the back of these equity values, the Company
was able to revive its credit and thereby financed an ambitious programme of fitting
out new ships, rebuilding its Gold Coast establishments and entering upon contracts
for the delivery of slaves. After the South Sea Bubble and despite the financial
challenges posed by the resulting restrictions on credit supplies, the Company meant
business and it was apparent that the financial markets also believed that the
Company remained fixed upon a business plan to which the markets apparently
assigned a real chance of success.
To what extent was success achieved in the real business of the Company –
the export of trade goods for the purchase of slaves on the west coast of Africa and
slave importations into the British-controlled western hemisphere? We can only take
account here of such success in the revival of the slave trade numbers. Further studies
will have to be undertaken to determine how long any resulting financial success was

















































RAC and South Sea Company together could wrest control of the trans-Atlantic slave
trade from the independent British slave trader. The Slave Voyages Database allows
us to count the slaves who were landed in British-controlled ports from British-
registered ships and from those ships of the RAC and the South Sea Company in
particular. According to contracts drawn up between the two companies, the
anticipated arrangement would be that any slaves contracted for delivery by the RAC
to the South Sea Company, would be handed over to the latter in Africa. As early as
September 1720 the Company was planning and outfitting voyages to establish bases
in Angola and at Cabinda in particular.
23 Thereafter mention is made of contracts with
the South Sea Company to supply that firm with slaves at Cabinda.
24 The Database
shows that in the years 1721-30, the South Sea Company was able to take more than
3500 slaves from Cabinda to South America and the Caribbean. We can see in Figure
5 the apparent effects of such arrangements with South Sea Company (SSC) landings
of slaves following the pattern of RAC landings with a lag of a year or two.
25 The
lower panel of the figure is meant to illustrate the RAC and South Sea Company’s
shares in all British slave imports into the Western Hemisphere. It can accurately
reflect long-term trends in such shares perhaps only after 1712. Before 1689 the
Company’s charter would have purposely given the Company a monopoly on such
imports, but because of cheating by the Company’s own servants and, to a much
larger degree, because of slave imports by independent traders (“the interlopers”),
many unrecorded voyages and landings of slaves may well have escaped inclusion in
the Slave Voyages Database. After 1689 and up to 1712, when the Company
23 Davies (1957, pp. 231-4) writes of Angola from which the Company’s
attentions were distracted after 1689, but apparently a new base was
planned to be established there in 1720. T70/90/84, 96. Shortly
afterwards Portuguese representatives in Britain were making their
complaints known about the Company’s activities in Angola. T70/91/11.
24 T70/91/133, 163.
25 The figure is constructed from the “slamimp” variable of the Slave
Voyages Database. The identifications of imports by nationality and40
attempted to collect a fee from British independent traders for the privilege of trading
in slaves within the boundaries of the Company’s former charter rights, the incentives
to engage in secret trade independent of the Company were lessened.
26 It is in this
period we can see a clear separation between RAC imports and all observed British
imports into British America. The increasing gap (in natural logarithmic terms) shows
that the RAC market share was declining and the co-operation between the RAC and
the South Sea Company after 1720 did little to reverse that decline. The RAC and the
South Sea Company were never able to achieve together any more than 20 percent of
the all landings of negroes in British America in the years 1720-3.
We do not know if the new investors in the RAC thought they could arrest the
long-term relative decline in the volume of the Company’s trade in slaves and we can
only presume that they thought they could sufficiently improve the firm’s financial
performance to re-create acceptable returns on their investments. How they failed to
do the latter has to await future investigation. The RAC and its new investors may be
forgiven for thinking that the firm’s trade could be rebuilt. Figure 5 shows that the
South Sea Company was itself steadily building up its annual deliveries of slaves
prior to 1720 and although those efforts were ultimately financially unsuccessful, that
lack of success could have been rationally attributed to Spanish caprice and not to
anything inherently unsound about the corporate slave trade (Donnan 1930). But the
RAC’s historian has written of the long-term decline as inevitable and indeed has
even pointed to insufficient profitability in the company’s halcyon days as a harbinger
of its decline (Davies 1957, p. 347). How large those profits would have to have been
company depend upon the various ship-registration variables contained
in the database.
26 Because independent traders’ activities largely escaped detection
and precise measurement, the extent to which the RAC’s pre1689
monopoly was breached has to proceed on the basis of the best slave
demographic analyses to be had. It is highly likely that even at the
height of its strength under its charter, the RAC never achieved a
majority share in total British slave imports (Carlos and Kruse
1996).41
to create success we are not told. We have documented already that the RAC was able
to earn 6 p.c.p.a. on average in the first eighteen years of its existence and to deliver
most of those return to shareholders in the form of payouts. It was in the re-creation of
success to at least that degree that we can surmise the Company wanted to re-establish
its facilities in West Africa and to push on into establishing new ones in Angola.
Clearly it experienced some squeeze upon financial margins that put a stop to its
efforts after 1724. What those margins were precisely need to be identified and until
that is done, the history of the Company’s management prowess cannot be completed.
If the story has to be concluded with a final judgement that managerial incompetence
was material to the Company’s downfall, then that will temper the story we have told

























































Figure 5. British Slave Imports into the Western Hemisphere
Source:Slave Voyages Database43
VI
The Royal African Company re-financing in 1720 is a semi-success story that
emerges from the South Sea Bubble. Corporate slave trading was perhaps an
impractical means for carrying on that nefarious trade and perhaps it had been so ever
since the 1680s. The smaller unit of trade represented by the independent slaver or the
small consortium of trading captains who would put together the occasional slaving
voyage was the better means and perhaps people knowledgeable of the slaving
business in 1720 should have known better. Apparently they did not. The subscribers
of new finance to the Company were, after all, somewhat likely to be members of the
higher political and aristocratic classes. Maybe they were but examples of the type of
investor who precisely did not know better. For a few years after 1720 new equity
capital continued to be supplied to the RAC and the RAC valiantly outfitted ships and
invested in its West African facilities. Unlike the new marine insurance firms that
were floated and financed during and after the South Sea Bubble, the real side of the
RAC’s business eventually did collapse. But like these insurance companies, the RAC
was also a company whose finances were not only transformed in 1720, but also
survived the collapse of the South Sea scheme. This is the success side to its story and
does speak well of the firm’s financial management.
Textbook exercises in corporate finance show the student the many ways in
which new equity can be raised in efficient markets without any adverse effects upon
shareholders’ wealth. A good example is the issue of shares by rights to original
shareholders. It makes no difference what the rights price is, whether it is above
market value or book value of shares, the effects of a rights issue are always wealth-
neutral because the firm’s equity remains 100 percent-owned by the original
shareholders. The problem of the refinancing of the Royal African Company in 1720
was that its original owners were not numerous enough nor wealthy enough to44
provide the four-fold expansion in equity that was required by the firm’s
management. The RAC solution to this problem was the issue of what now would be
called an innovated security. It was priced and managed in ways that allowed it to be
sold to such large numbers of new capitalists so that it could raise a fund to
compensate original shareholders for the foreseeable declines in the value of their
shares. The new equity raised was transparently applied to extinguish debts and to
make a cash payout to original shareholders so that their wealth was unaffected and,
most importantly, could be foreseen to be unaffected. The result was that an easy-to-
understand arbitrage pricing relationship between original shares and the innovated
subscription shares was established. The evidence shows that any profitable arbitrage
opportunities were efficiently extinguished in the stock markets of 1720. A close
modern parallel to the Royal African case is the efficient arbitrage between fully-paid
shares and instalment receipts found in many Commonwealth countries today (Pinder
1998 and Charupat and Prisman 2004). In the South Sea Company’s case the
innovated securities, the subscription shares, had a different design and were certainly
applied to very different uses than were the Royal African subscription shares. Yet the
evidence shows that these securities were also the objects of no less efficient arbitrage
than were the Royal African subscription shares (Shea, 2007b). Our study of the
markets for RAC subscription shares complements this research on the South Sea
Company’s subscription share markets. There was a degree of pricing efficiency and
even sophistication in the design of innovated securities that do not fit easily within
the histories of the South Sea Bubble as they have usually been written. Our story of
the Royal African Company’s re-financing in 1720 is therefore somewhat revisionary
of South Sea Bubble literature.45
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Appendix A: A Brief History of the Equity Capital of the Royal African Company,
1674-1750
The Royal African Company had a corporate existence for three quarters of a century.
Its equity capital structure underwent several changes in that long period which has
made it difficult to write a coherent history of returns to investment over the entire
history of the Company. In this appendix we describe the events that have to be taken
into account to define a standard share unit for equity investment in the company for
its entire existence.
The Royal African Company was a limited prototype of the great moneyed
company of the early 18
th Century. As it was formed in 1671 the Company was a
reorganised monopoly on the English African trade. This meant that the firm had
monopoly rights to trade from certain West African trading posts (factories) with
England. The trade was practically carried on as a triangular trade between West
Africa, the Caribbean and South America and England. The firm had occasional
dealings with various holders of the Asiento, the Spanish grant of monopoly rights to
bring slaves into Spain’s South American and Caribbean possessions.
The Company lacked one significant feature of the later moneyed companies,
such as the East India Company; it never held loans to the government or Crown as a
large portion of its assets. The Restoration Crown’s finances were certainly
embarrassed when the Royal African Company was reorganised, but the Crown never
looked to the Company as a means of restoring its credit except through limited
participation by courtiers in the share equity and the revenues that would be generated
via taxation on the African trade. In other significant respects, however, the Company
bears comparison with its most notorious moneyed successor, the South Sea
Company. The Company was reformed after a potentially lucrative trade with Africa
had been destroyed in the Second Dutch War. It was in anticipation of the restoration50
of peaceful trade, with newly-secured trade rights associated with a share in the
Asiento contract, that the Company was reformed. It was founded upon hopes and
anticipations very similar to those on which the South Sea Company’s trade was to be
founded in 1713. Davies (1957) used the extensive collection of Royal African
Company records (class T70) at the National Archives (NA), Kew, to research his
book, The Royal African Company. It is that book and those NA records that are the
sources for the following capital history.
The original share equity in the Company came from the reorganised share
equity in the earlier Company of Royal Adventurers Trading to Africa. Further share
equity was issued to former creditors of that Company and shareholders from the
once-competitive Gambia Adventurers. We can start tracing the value and size of this
capital from 1674. At that time there were 1100 shares on which £100 had been paid.
These shares we take as our standard shares.
We need to define standard shares so that we can understand share values and
payouts over long periods in which there were changes in the definition of nominal
shares in the Company’s stock. We keep track of these changes with the use of an
adjustment factor. One way to think of what the adjustment factor achieves is that it
corrects for changes in the definition of nominal shares when such changes have, at
least in part, no effect on the wealth of a shareholder. There are a large number of
possible changes in shares that require new adjustment factors. Share splits, share
bonuses and share amalgamations are the obvious cases. But rights issues or share
repurchases at rights prices or repurchase prices different from the current market
values of shares also require changes in the adjustment factor. Share prices and
dividends on what we call standard shares are simply values and payouts for nominal
shares multiplied by the adjustment factor. The number of standard shares issued and
outstanding is the number of nominal shares divided by the adjustment factor.51
After first setting our adjustment factor to 1 in 1674, we have to account in
1691 for the effects of a 300% stock bonus. This is just the same as a four-for-one
stock split. It of course takes the nominal shares from 1100 in number to 4400 and
cuts the price of nominal shares by three quarters, but exercises no influence on
shareholder wealth. This event requires us to make the adjustment factor 4 in order to
correct fully for the wealth-neutral effects of this event.
In March 1693 there was a 1-for-2 rights issue at £40 per nominal share when
market prices were slightly higher than that.
27 Only about 2/3’s of the issue was taken
up. Then there was a 1-for-1 rights issue in 1697 at £12 per share that could be paid
for in instalments that stretched to early October 1698. Using a series of share prices
from Houghton’s A Collection of Letters for Improvement of Husbandry and Trade,
and from some of the earliest issues of The Course we can observe that the rights
prices implied by these instalments were just a bit below nominal share prices.
Therefore the measured adjustment factor drifted above 4 by the end of the
seventeenth century.
In December 1702 the Company started to make calls upon shareholders.
28
The first, of £6 per share, was due in March 1703. In June 1704 there was another call
of £7 per share that could be paid in three instalments, the last of which was not due
for payment until March 1705. In April 1707 there was a further call of £4 per share.
When matched with prices of shares closest to the dates on which all these calls were
due, the resulting alteration in the adjustment factor brings it back down to a value
just below 2.
In September 1712 the Company was poised for what was hoped was to be a
revival of its fortunes in anticipation of the peace to follow the War of the Spanish
27 Scott (1912), Vol. 2, p. 26.52
Succession. The parlous state of its finances, however, made a wholesale
reorganisation of its capital necessary. In December 1712 there was a £3-per share
call. With the substantial concessions granted for early payment of the call it appears
that the actual call amounted to about £2.3 per nominal share. The price of nominal
shares at the time was about £3.5. At the same time (January 1713), nominal shares
were amalgamated on a 1-for-10 basis. This reduced the number of nominal shares
back to something like the number of original shares (1009) in 1674. To make matters
no less complicated, the Company then declared a 50% stock bonus upon which £100
(per bonus share) was immediately called. All these machinations greatly deflated the
adjustment factor, but in the end there was no substantial change in the number of
original shares issued and outstanding. The only substantial change in that regard in
1713 came with a conversion of about 3000 Company bonds into shares.
The next major change in the Company’s capital came during the South Sea
Bubble. In April 1720, when there were 4304 nominal shares, it was proposed that
15,696 new shares were to be publicly issued at £25 per share. As it was, about
15,519 such new shares were issued. Prices for nominal shares were currently
between £60 and £65 per share. The reason why original shareholders could agree to
such a public issue was that a portion of the proceeds (£52,400) coming from it was to
be used mostly to pay them a cash dividend that could amount to as much as £10 per
nominal share. Another portion (£75,696) was to relieve proprietors of liabilities they
had incurred in support of the firm. So, even though their original shares were to be
eventually treated equal with new shares that were being publicly offered at £25 per
share, they would have cash in pocket and their original shares that had a total value
of a bit more than £60. This was just about the market value for original shares before
the public offer was made. The offer was made during the course of the South Sea
28 It was quite common in company charters that shareholders’
liabilities were not strictly limited. Companies could demand, from53
Bubble and Royal African share prices were as buoyant as prices of many other
shares. The effect on the adjustment factor of the public share offer at below-market
prices was quite substantial. The adjustment factor was slightly less than 0.06 in the
years 1713-19, but had more than doubled to 0.142 by EoY 1720 and stood at 0.146
by EoY 1721.
In November 1722 there was a 5 percent call upon shares. It was to be paid in
two instalments; one 2 percent instalment to be paid by 20 December 1722 and the
other 3 percent instalment to be paid by 1 March 1723.
29 Just prior to these dates we
have nominal share prices around £7.5 and £7.6 respectively, which we use to deflate
our adjustment factor. By the end of 1723 there was a 1-for-2 amalgamation of
shares
30 that cuts the adjustment factor in half. At the same time there was a rights
issue that resulted in about 1920 new nominal shares. Since the rights terms were very
close to market terms, there was no effect on the adjustment factor.
In March 1727 there was a further 1-for-8 amalgamation of shares and then a
further 5 percent call on shares in April. Even after the March amalgamation of shares
the April price of shares was only about £8.75 so that by this time the adjustment
factor that creates standard shares of 1674 has become practically microscopic. The
final equity-capital event for the firm before its dissolution in 1750 is a 10 percent
stock bonus in 1733.
The graphs below depict end-of-year (EoY) values for our calculated
adjustment factor and the resulting numbers of standard shares. EoY share value data
are taken variously from Houghton, Freke or Castaing. EoY payouts are constructed
from several sources; the early payout history for the Company (1672-1702) is found
in the General Court Minutes (T70/100 and 101). Records of subsequent payouts are
time to time, payments from shareholders. These were termed “calls”.
29 T70/180, front cover.
30 T70/1180.54
to be found in T70/1186, Rough Drafts and Copy Book A.
31 The graphic depictions
below for values of payouts and shares pertain to standard shares of 1674.
31 ‘Dividends made’, p.132.
FIG. A.1 Adjustment Factors, Total Numbers, Dividends and Values of Royal African Company
Standard Shares
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